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Abstract
A multiple-input single-output cognitive radio downlink network is studied with simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer. In this network, a secondary user coexists with multiple primary users and
multiple energy harvesting receivers. In order to guarantee secure communication and energy harvesting,
the problem of robust secure artificial noise-aided beamforming and power splitting design is investigated
under imperfect channel state information (CSI). Specifically, the transmit power minimization problem
and the max-min fairness energy harvesting problem are formulated for both the bounded CSI error
model and the probabilistic CSI error model. These problems are non-convex and challenging to solve.
A one-dimensional search algorithm is proposed to solve these problems based on S-Procedure under
the bounded CSI error model and based on Bernstein-type inequalities under the probabilistic CSI error
model. It is shown that the optimal robust secure beamforming can be achieved under the bounded CSI
error model, whereas a suboptimal beamforming solution can be obtained under the probabilistic CSI
error model. A tradeoff is elucidated between the secrecy rate of the secondary user receiver and the
energy harvested by the energy harvesting receivers under a max-min fairness criterion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE unprecedented increase of mobile devices and escalating high data rate requirements haveresulted in severe spectrum scarcity problem. Cognitive radio (CR) is a promising technique that
aims to utilize spectrum efficiently and alleviate the spectrum scarcity problem [1]. In CR under spectrum
sharing, a secondary user (SU) can coexist with a primary user (PU) based on the condition that the
interference caused by the SU is tolerable to the PU. Since CR has the potential to improve spectrum
efficiency, it has been widely investigated for traditional cellular networks, relay networks, and wireless
sensor networks [2] and [3]. On the other hand, the escalating requirement for high data rate and the
ubiquitous wireless services have also contributed to the sharp growth of energy consumption and resulted
in energy scarcity problem, especially for CR with energy-constrained devices such as limited-energy
wireless sensors and cellular phones [3]-[6]. In order to address the energy scarcity problem, a number
of works focused on maximizing the energy efficiency of CR networks [3]-[10].
Recently, a promising technology called simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT)
has been proposed to solve the energy scarcity problem, and it has attracted much attention [11]-[13].
Specifically, radio frequency (RF) signals radiated by transmitters have dual purposes. RF signals not
only can carry information, but also can be used as a source for wireless power transfer charging the
energy-constrained communication devices. Thus, in CR with energy-constrained communication devices
such as cellular phones, it is of great importance to investigate CR with SWIPT that can improve spectrum
efficiency and energy utilization simultaneously [5]-[14]. However, due to the inherent characteristics of
CR with SWIPT, malicious energy harvesting receivers (EHRs) may exist and illegitimately access the
PU bands or change the radio environment. As a result, the legitimate SU is unable to use frequency
bands of the PU or has his confidential transmitted information intercepted [14] and [15]. Thus, the
security of CR with SWIPT is also of crucial importance.
Physical-layer security, which is based on the physical layer characteristics of the wireless channels,
has been proposed to improve the security of wireless communication systems [16]. However, it was
shown that the secrecy rate of a wireless communication system with physical-layer security is limited
by the channel state information (CSI). In CR, the secrecy rate of the SU is further limited since the
3transmit power of the SU should be controlled to protect the PU from harmful interference [17]. In order
to improve the secrecy rate of the SU, both multi-antenna technique and beamforming technique have
been introduced [17]-[21]. However, the optimal beamforming schemes proposed in [17]-[21] may not
be appropriate in CR with SWIPT since energy harvested by EHRs should be considered. On the other
hand, in practice, it is difficult to obtain the perfect CSI due to the existence of channel estimation errors
and quantization errors, especially in CR with SWIPT, where there is no cooperation among SUs, PUs
and EHRs. Even worse, the imperfect CSI can significantly deteriorate the beamforming performance.
Thus, it is of great importance to design robust secure beamforming for CR with SWIPT.
Based on the model of CSI errors, there are two different approaches to designing robust secure
beamforming. The first approach uses a bounded set to model the CSI errors. It has the advantage
in implementation complexity but the obtained results can underestimate the actual performance. The
second approach uses a probabilistic model to describe the CSI error. In this case, it finds solutions that
can be efficiently computed and provide a good approximation to outage-based constraints. The second
approach is mainly applicable to scenarios where there exist delay-sensitive communication devices or
where constraints on the secure beamforming design are loose. These two approaches have been widely
applied to design robust secure beamforming for the traditional wireless communication systems [23]-
[31], wireless communication systems with SWIPT [32]-[37], and CR with SWIPT [14]. The works in
[23]-[37] are related to this paper and they are summarized as follows.
Traditional wireless communication systems: The design of robust secure beamforming has been
analyzed under the bounded CSI error model in [23]-[26], and under the probabilistic CSI error model in
[27]-[31]. Specifically, using the worst-case optimization, robust secure transmission schemes were studied
for multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channels in [23], and for multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channels in [24]. It was shown that by introducing a cooperative jammer, the achievable
secrecy rate can be significantly improved. In [25] and [26], the authors extended the design of robust
secure transmission schemes to the scenarios where there exist several multi-antenna eavesdroppers. An
artificial noise (AN)-aided transmit strategy was used in [26]. It was shown that the AN-aided transmit
strategy is an efficient way to improve the secrecy rate. In order to improve the performance under the
worst-case scenario, i.e., the bounded CSI error model, robust secure beamforming was designed under
outage-based constraints for MISO wiretap channels [27]-[29]. In [28], three approximate forms for the
outage-based constraint were derived, and this work was extended to the scenario with several multi-
antenna eavesdroppers [29]. Using the Bernstein-type inequality [30], [31], the robust secure beamforming
was designed for MISO wiretap channels with an AN-aided transmit strategy [30] and for MIMO wiretap
4channels [31]. However, the robust secure beamforming schemes proposed in [23]-[31] are not appropriate
in wireless communication systems with SWIPT, because the energy harvesting requirement of EHRs is
not considered.
Wireless communication systems with SWIPT: In order to guarantee secure communication and
energy harvesting requirement, robust secure beamforming design problems were studied in wireless
communication systems with SWIPT [32]-[37]. Using the bounded CSI error model, robust secure
beamforming schemes were designed to optimize different objectives over the MISO secrecy channels,
such as the transmit power [32], [33], the minimum energy harvested by EHRs [34], the secrecy rate
and energy harvested by EHRs [35]. The work in [32], [33] was extended to the MIMO system [36]. In
[32]-[36], the bounded CSI error model was used, whereas the probabilistic CSI error model was used
for the MISO system [37].
A. Motivation and Contributions
Compared with the traditional wireless communication systems with SWIPT, a robust secure beam-
forming design in secure CR with SWIPT is more important and meaningful. In secure CR with SWIPT,
the robust design of beamforming not only provides the SU with a reasonably high secrecy rate, but also
protects the PU from harmful interference. Moreover, in secure CR with SWIPT, the robust beamforming
design can guarantee energy harvesting requirement and prolong the operation time. Although the robust
beamforming design issue has been investigated in the traditional wireless communication systems with
SWIPT in [32]-[36], few study, with the exception of [14], has been devoted to designing robust
beamforming schemes for CR with SWIPT.
In this paper, we focus on designing robust secure beamforming schemes for MISO CR with SWIPT
under both the bounded CSI error model and the probabilistic CSI error model. The optimization
objectives are the minimum transmit power of the cognitive base station (CBS) or the energy harvested
by EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion. The system model considered in our work is pertaining to
that in [14]. However, our work differs from [14] in four aspects. Firstly, in our paper, a power splitting
receiver architecture is adopted at the SU receiver. However, it has not been considered in [14] and thus the
desired SU receiver cannot simultaneously decode information and harvest energy. Moreover, we jointly
optimize the power splitting ratio in order to further improve the achievable performance. Secondly, the
interference power leakage-to-transmit power ratio was identified as the optimization objective in [14].
In this case, the interference imposed on PUs from the SU may be intolerable. In our work, in order
to protect PUs from harmful interference, interference power constraints are imposed. Thirdly, different
5from [14], we focus on designing robust secure beamforming to minimize the transmit power of the
CBS or to maximize the energy harvested by EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion. Finally, both
the bounded CSI error model and the probabilistic CSI error model are considered here, whereas only
the bounded case was considered in [14]. We now summarize the main contributions of this paper as
follows.
1) Robust beamforming design problems are studied for secure MISO CR with SWIPT under the
bounded CSI error model. Robust AN-aided beamforming and the power splitting ratio are jointly
designed, and they are subject to the constraints on the secrecy rate, the interference power, and
the transmit power. The optimization objectives are the minimum transmit power of the CBS or the
energy harvested by EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion. These two problems are non-convex
and challenging, because there are infinite inequality constraints and coupling among different
variables. In order to solve those two problems, a one-dimensional search algorithm is proposed
based on the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and S-Procedure [38], [39]. It is proved that the optimal
robust secure beamforming can always be found and the rank of the optimal AN covariance matrix
is unity.
2) Both an outage-constrained transmit power minimization problem and an outage EH maximization
problem are formulated in secure MISO CR with SWIPT under the probabilistic CSI error model.
We jointly design robust AN-aided beamforming and the power splitting ratio under the outage
secrecy rate constraint, the maximum interference probabilistic constraint, and the outage EH con-
straint. Since there are no closed-form expressions for these probabilistic constraints, approximations
to these constraints, which are based on the Bernstein-type inequalities [38], [41], are made in order
to make the formulated problems tractable. It is shown that the optimal robust secure beamforming
cannot always be obtained and a suboptimal beamforming solution is found.
3) Simulation results show that robust secure beamforming under the probabilistic CSI error model can
provide performance gains compared with that under the bounded CSI error model at the cost of
higher implementation complexity. A tradeoff is found between the secrecy rate of the SU receiver
and the energy harvested by EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion.
B. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model. Robust
secure beamforming design problems under the bounded CSI error model are examined in Section III.
Section IV presents robust secure beamforming design problems under the probabilistic CSI error model.
6Simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface capital letters and boldface lower case letters,
respectively. I denotes the identity matrix; vec(A) denotes the vectorization of matrix A and it is obtained
by stacking its column vectors. The Hermitian (conjugate) transpose, trace, and rank of a matrix A are
denoted respectively by AH, Tr(A) and Rank(A). x† represents the conjugate transpose of a vector x.
CM×N stands for a M -by-N dimensional complex matrix set. A  0 (A ≻ 0) represents that A is a
Hermitian positive semidefinite (definite) matrix. HN and HN+ represent a N -by-N dimensional Hermitian
matrix set and a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix set, respectively. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm
of a vector. |·| represents the absolute value of a complex scalar. x ∼ CN (u,Σ) means that x is a
random vector, which follows a complex Gaussian distribution with mean u and covariance matrix Σ.
E[·] denotes the expectation operator. Re (a) extracts the real part of vector a. R+ represents the set of
all nonnegative real numbers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A downlink MISO CR network with SWIPT under spectrum sharing is considered in Fig. 1, where
one secondary link, M primary links, and K energy harvesting links share the same spectrum. The CBS
is equipped with Nt antennas. The primary base station (PBS), the SU receiver, each PU receiver and
each EHR are equipped with single antenna. The PBS transmits information to M PU receivers while
the CBS provides a SWIPT service to the SU receiver, and transfers energy to K EHRs as long as the
interference imposed on M PU receivers from the CBS is tolerable. It is assumed that the SU receiver
is an energy-constrained device such as a cellular phone or a wireless sensor whose battery has limited
energy storage capacity [12]-[15]. Different from [14], a power splitting receiver architecture is adopted
in the SU receiver. Thus, the SU receiver splits the received signal power into two parts in order to
simultaneously decode information and harvest energy. Due to the inherent characteristics of CR and
SWIPT, EHRs may eavesdrop and intercept the information transmitted by the CBS. In this paper, we
assume that PU receivers are friendly users and do not eavesdrop the information sent by the CBS.
This assumption has been widely used in secure CR [12], [13], [17]-[21], [43]-[45]. All the channels
involved are assumed to be slow frequency-nonselective fading channels. Let K and I denote the set
K ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,K} and the set I ∆= {1, 2, · · · ,M}, respectively. The signals received at the SU receiver,
the kth EHR, and the interference signals imposed on the ith PU receiver from the CBS, denoted by y,
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Fig. 1: The system model.
ye,k, and yPU,i, where k ∈ K and i ∈ I , can be given, respectively, as
y = h†x+ ns (1a)
ye,k = g
†
kx+ ne,k, k ∈ K (1b)
yPU,i = q
†
ix, i ∈ I (1c)
where h ∈ CNt×1, gk ∈ CNt×1 and qk ∈ CNt×1 are the channel vectors between the CBS and the
SU receiver, the kth EHR and the ith PU receiver, respectively. In (1), ns ∼ CN
(
0, σ2s
)
and ne,k ∼
CN (0, σ2e) respectively denote the complex Gaussian noise at the SU receiver and the kth EHR, which
include the interference from the PBS and the additive complex Gaussian noise at the SU receiver and
the kth EHR. Note that the interferences at the SU receiver and the kth EHR from the PBS are assumed
to be circularly symmetric complex Gaussian. This interference model is the worst case model and has
8been widely used in [14], [43]-[45]. This model also covers the system models studied in [15], [17]-
[19], where the interferences from the PBS to the SU receiver and the kth EHR are negligible. In (1),
x ∈ CNt×1 is the transmit signal vector given as
x = ws+ v (2)
where s ∈ C1×1 and w ∈ CNt×1 denote the confidential information-bearing signal for the SU receiver
and the corresponding beamforming vector, respectively. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
E[|s|2] = 1. v ∈ CNt×1 is the noise vector artificially generated by the CBS in order to improve the
secrecy rate of the SU and energy transfer at EHRs. It is assumed that v ∼ CN (0,Σ), where Σ is the
AN covariance matrix to be designed. Since the SU receiver is equipped with a power splitting device,
the equivalent signal received at the SU receiver for information decoding, denoted by yD, is given as
yD =
√
ρ
(
h†x+ ns
)
+ ns,p (3)
where ns,p is the additional processing noise generated by the SU receiver. It is assumed that ns,p ∼
CN (0, σ2s,p) and ns,p is independent of ns and ne,k. The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the power splitting
ratio, which denotes that ρ portion of the received power is used to decode information and 1−ρ portion
of the received power is used to transfer energy. Thus, the secrecy rate of the SU receiver, denoted by
Rs, is given as
Rs = min
k∈K
{Cs −Ce,k} (4a)
Cs = log2
(
1 +
ρh†ww†h
ρ (h†Σh+ σ2s) + σ
2
s,p
)
(4b)
Ce,k = log2
(
1 +
g
†
kww
†gk
g
†
kΣgk + σ
2
e
)
(4c)
and the energy harvested at the SU receiver and the kth EHR, denoted by Es and Ee,k, can be respectively
expressed as
Es = (1− ρ) η
(
h†ww†h+ h†Σh+ σ2s
)
(5a)
Ee,k = η
(
g
†
kww
†gk + g
†
kΣgk + σ
2
e
)
, k ∈ K (5b)
where η ∈ (0, 1] is a constant that denotes the energy conversion efficiency at the SU receiver and the
EHRs.
It is assumed that the CSI h is available at both CBS and SU [14], [29]-[35]. However, the channel
vectors gk, k ∈ K and qi, i ∈ I cannot be perfectly known since there is no cooperation among the CBS,
PU receivers and EHRs [14], [29]-[35].
9III. WORST-CASE ROBUST SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In this section, the robust secure beamforming design problems are considered under the bounded
CSI error model. The transmit power of the CBS is minimized and the energy harvested by the EHRs
under a max-min fairness criterion is maximized subject to the secrecy rate constraint, energy harvesting
constraints, interference power constraints, and the transmit power constraint. In order to solve the robust
secure beamforming design problems, which are non-convex and have infinite inequality constraints,
a one-dimensional search algorithm is proposed based on SDR and S-Procedure. The inner algorithm
solves a convex optimization problem, which can be solved by using the software CVX [40].
A. The Bounded CSI Error Model
Quantization errors for CSI can be modeled as the bounded CSI error forms, which are deterministic
models [20], [23]-[26]. The bounded CSI error model for the channel vector gk, k ∈ K, is given as
gk = gk +∆gk, k ∈ K (6a)
Ψe,k
∆
=
{
∆gk ∈ CNt×1 : ∆g†k∆gk ≤ ξ2e,k
}
(6b)
and the bounded CSI error model for the channel vector qi, i ∈ I , is given as
qi = qi +∆qi, i ∈ I (7a)
ΨP,i
∆
=
{
∆qi ∈ CNt×1 : ∆q†i∆qi ≤ ξ2P,i
}
(7b)
where gk and qi are the estimates of the channel vectors gk and qm, respectively; Ψe,k and ΨP,i denote
the uncertainty regions of gk and qm; ∆gk and ∆qi represent the channel estimation errors of gk and
qm; ξe,k and ξP,i are the radiuses of the uncertainty regions Ψe,k and ΨP,i, respectively.
B. The Worst-Case Transmit Power Minimization Problem
Let W and H denote W = ww† and H = hh†, respectively. Based on the bounded CSI error model,
the worst-case transmit power minimization problem subject to the secrecy rate constraint, EH constraints,
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interference power constraints and the transmit power constraint, denoted by P1, is given as
P1 : min
W,Σ,ρ
Tr (W +Σ) (8a)
s.t. C1 : Rs ≥ Rmin, ∀∆gk ∈ Ψe,k, k ∈ K (8b)
C2 : (1− ρ) η (Tr (WH+ΣH) + σ2s) ≥ ψs (8c)
C3 : η
(
g
†
k (W+Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ ψe,k, ∀∆gk ∈ Ψe,k (8d)
C4 : q†i (W +Σ)qi ≤ PIn,i, ∀∆qi ∈ ΨP,i, i ∈ I (8e)
C5 : Tr (W+Σ) ≤ Pth (8f)
C6 : 0 < ρ < 1 (8g)
C7 : Rank (W) = 1 (8h)
C8 : Σ  0, W  0 (8i)
where Rmin is the minimum secrecy rate requirement of the CBS; ψs and ψe,k denote the required
minimum harvesting energy required at the SU receiver and the kth EHR, respectively; PIn,i represents
the maximum tolerable interference power of the ith PU receiver; Pth is the maximum transmit power of
the CBS. In (8b)-(8i), C1 can guarantee that the secrecy rate of the SU is not less than Rmin; C2 and
C3 are the EH constraints of the SU receiver and EHRs; the interference power constraint C4 is imposed
in order to protect the QoS of PUs; C5 limits the maximum transmit power of the CBS. Note that P1
may be infeasible due to the transmit power constraint C5. Owing to the non-convex constraints in C2
and C7, P1 is non-convex and difficult to be solved. Moreover, there are infinite inequality constraints
to be satisfied due to the uncertain regions, Ψe,k and ΨP,i, which make P1 even more challenging. In
order to solve P1, SDR and S-Procedure are applied as follows.
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure) [39]: Let fi (z) = z†Aiz+ 2Re
{
b
†
iz
}
+ ci, i ∈ {1, 2}, where z ∈ CN×1,
Ai ∈ HN , bi ∈ CN×1 and ci ∈ R. Then, the expression f1 (z) ≤ 0 ⇒ f2 (z) ≤ 0 holds if and only if
there exists a α ≥ 0 such that
α
 A1 b1
b
†
1 c1
−
 A2 b2
b
†
2 c2
  0 (9)
provided that there exists a vector ẑ such that fi (ẑ) < 0.
By introducing slack variables, t = 1/ρ, and β, where t > 1 and β ≥ 1, and applying Lemma 1, the
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secrecy rate constraint C1 can be equivalently expressed as
Tr
{(
W +
(
1− 2Rminβ)Σ)H}+ (1− 2Rminβ) (σ2s + σ2s,pt) ≥ 0 (10a)
Γk (ωk,W,Σ, β)
=
 ωkI− (W − (β − 1)Σ) − (W− (β − 1)Σ) gk
−gk† (W − (β − 1)Σ) (β − 1) σ2e − gk† (W − (β − 1)Σ) gk − ωkξ2e,k
  0, k ∈ K (10b)
where ωk ≥ 0, k ∈ K, is a slack variable. The proof of (10) can be found in Appendix A. Similarly, by
applying Lemma 1, the constraints C3 and C4 can be equivalently expressed as
Γk (µk,W,Σ) =
 µkI+ (W+Σ) (W +Σ)∆gk
gk
† (W +Σ) gk
† (W +Σ) gk + σ
2
e − ψe,kη−1 − µkξ2e,k
  0, k ∈ K
(11a)
Γi (δi,W,Σ) =
 δiI− (W+Σ) − (W +Σ)qi
−qi† (W +Σ) PIn,i − qi† (W +Σ)qi − δiξ2P,i
  0, i ∈ I (11b)
where µk ≥ 0 and δi ≥ 0, k ∈ K, i ∈ I , are slack variables. Equation (11) can be similarly obtained by
following Appendix A. By using SDR, P1 can be relaxed to the following problem as
P2 : min
W,Σ,t,β,{ωk},{µk},{δi}
Tr (W +Σ) (12a)
s.t. Tr {(W +Σ)H}+ σ2s −
ψs
η
(
1 +
1
t− 1
)
≥ 0 (12b)
t > 1 (12c)
β ≥ 1 (12d)
ωk, µk, δi ≥ 0 (12e)
(10) , (11) , C5, C8. (12f)
Unfortunately, since the variable β couples with the other variables, P2 is still non-convex. Using the fact
that Rmin ≥ 0, (8b) and (8f), one can obtain β ≤ 1 + Pth‖h‖2/σ2s,p. Thus, the following inequalities
can be obtained
1 ≤ β ≤ 1 + Pth
σ2s,p
‖h‖2. (13)
While P2 is non-convex, it is however convex for a given β. Thus, the optimal β value can be searched
from the interval [1, 1 + Pth‖h‖2/σ2s,p], such that the optimal values of W, Σ, and β will achieve the
12
TABLE I: The one-dimensional line search algorithm
Algorithm 1: The one-dimensional line search algorithm
1: Setting:
the minimum secrecy rate Rmin, the minimum EH, ψs and ψe,k, k ∈ K,
the maximum tolerable interference power PIn,i, i ∈ I, the maximum transmit power,Pth,
the radiuses of the uncertainty regions, ξe,k, ξP,i and the uniform search step, τ1.
2: Inputting:
the CSI,h, the estimated CSI, gk and qi.
3: Initialization:
the iteration index n = 1.
4: Optimization:
5: D for β=1:τ1:1 + Pth‖h‖2/σ2s,p
6: use the software CVX to solve the optimization problem P3 for the given β, given as
P3 : min
W,Σ,t,{ωk},{µk},{δi}
Tr (W +Σ)
s.t. (10) , (11) , (12b) , (12c) , (12e) , C5 and C8 are satisfied.
7: obtain the robust matrix, Wn, Σn, the slack variable, tn, and Tr (Wn +Σn);
8: set n = n+ 1;
9: D end
10: Comparison:
11: compare all Tr (Wn +Σn) and obtain the minimum Tr (W+Σ),
the optimal robust matrices, Wopt, Σopt and optimal ρopt = 1/topt.
12: Eigenvalue decomposition:
13: perform eigenvalue decomposition for Wopt and obtain the optimal robust beamforming wopt.
minimum transmit power in P2. Using the uniform sampling method, Algorithm 1 is proposed to solve
P2. Table I summarizes the details of Algorithm 1. We can now state the following two theorems.
Theorem 1: For problem P2, assume that the minimum secrecy rate Rmin > 0 and that P2 is feasible,
the optimal W is unique and its rank is one.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 indicates that the transmit power minimization given as P1 can be obtained by
solving the rank-relaxed problem presented in P2. The optimal transmit matrix W is rank-one in spite of
the numbers of the PU receivers and EHRs. Moreover, for any β, the optimal W is rank-one. Thus, the
optimal robust secure beamforming vector can be obtained by eigenvalue decomposition over W, which
is the eigenvector related to the maximum eigenvalue of W.
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Theorem 2: The AN covariance matrix of P2, Σ, has the rank-one property regardless of the number
of PU receivers and the number of the EHRs.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 1 and it is omitted due to space limitation.
C. The Worst-Case Max-Min Fairness EH Problem
In this subsection, in order to provide fairness to EHRs under the bounded CSI error model, we
consider the robust max-min fairness EH problem. The robust secure beamforming design for the max-
min fairness EH, under the secrecy rate constraint, the EH constraint of the SU receiver, interference
power constraints and the transmit power constraint, can be formulated as the following problem
P4 : max
W,Σ
min
∆gk∈Ψe,k,k∈K
η
(
g
†
k (W+Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
(14a)
s.t. C1, C2, C4− C8. (14b)
Note that P4 may be infeasible due to the stated constraints. Using a slack variable, τ , we can express
P4 as the following equivalent problem
P5 : max
W,Σ
τ (15a)
s.t. η
(
g
†
k (W +Σ) gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ τ,∆gk ∈ Ψe,k, k ∈ K (15b)
C1, C2, C4− C8. (15c)
By applying Lemma 1, the constraint (15b) can be equivalently written as
Γk (µk,W,Σ, τ ) =
 µkI+ (W +Σ) (W +Σ)∆gk
gk
† (W +Σ) gk
† (W+Σ)gk + σ
2
e − τη−1 − µkξ2e,k
  0, k ∈ K
(16)
where µk ≥ 0 is a slack variable. Following a similar procedure, P5 can be relaxed as
P6 : max
W,Σ,t,β,{ωk},{µk},{δi}
τ (17a)
s.t. (10) , (11b) , (12b)− (12e) , (16) , C5 and C8 (17b)
where ωk and δi are slack variables associated with the secrecy rate constraint and the interference power
constraint, C1 and C4, respectively. Problem P6 is still non-convex due to the coupling between β and
Σ in (10b). Similar to P2, it is seen that P6 is convex for a given β. Thus, Algorithm 1 can be modified
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to solve P6. In this case, the minimum EH constraint of EHRs is dropped and P3 is replaced by the
following problem
P7 : max
W,Σ,t,{ωk},{µk},{δi}
τ (18a)
s.t. (17b) . (18b)
By solving P6, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3: Assuming that the minimum secrecy rate Rmin > 0 and that P6 is feasible, the optimal
W of P6 is unique and has rank one.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, and it is based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions of P6. This proof is omitted due to space limitation.
Remark 2: Theorem 3 implies that the optimal robust secure beamforming for P4 can be obtained by
solving the relaxed problem presented in P6. The solution obtained by solving P6 is optimal regardless
of the numbers of PU receivers and EHRs.
Theorem 4: The optimal AN covariance matrix of P6 is rank-one if Rmin > 0 and P6 is feasible.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 1 and it is omitted due to space limitation.
Remark 3: Since the step 6 of Algorithm 1 solves a convex optimization problem, which can be solved
by using, for example, the interior-point method [39]. According to [46], the complexity of Algorithm 1 is
due to three parts, namely, the uniform line search, iteration complexity and the per-iteration computation
cost. Since the number of the positive semidefinite matrix constraints for P3 is the same as that of P7,
the difference between the complexity of P3 and that of P7 lies in the number of the uniform search. It
is assumed that the accuracy of the iteration is ε and the number of the uniform search is T1. Then, the
total complexity of Algorithm 1 under the bounded CSI error model is given as
T1 ln
(
ε−1
)O (KMN2t )√(2K +M + 2)Nt + 2M + 4K + 4{2N2t (Nt +O (KMN2t ))
+ (4 + 2K +M)
(
1 +O (KMN2t ))+ (2K +M) [(Nt + 1)3 +O (KMN2t ) (Nt + 1)2]
+O2 (KMN2t )} (19)
where O (·) is the big-O notation.
IV. OUTAGE-CONSTRAINED ROBUST SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN
The robust secure beamforming design problems under the bounded CSI error model can guarantee
that the SU achieves the worst-case performance. However, the results obtained under the bounded CSI
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error model are conservative since the extreme scenario may happen rarely [20], [27]-[31]. Moreover,
robust secure beamforming designed under the bounded error model is inappropriate to the delay-sensitive
CR where user applications such as voice and video can be sensitive to delay. Alternatively, the outage-
constrained robust secure beamformig design is more suitable, and it is designed under the probabilistic
CSI errors model [20], [27]-[31]. Thus, in this section, the robust secure beamforming design problems
are studied under the probabilistic constraints.
A. The Probabilistic CSI Error Model
In a probabilistic CSI error model, the CSI error is stochastic and follows a certain distribution, instead
of within a determined region. Specifically, the complex circular Gaussian CSI error model is applied,
which has been widely used [20], [27]-[31]. In this case, the channel vectors, gk, k ∈ K, and qi, i ∈ I ,
can be given as
gk = gk +∆gk, ∆gk ∼ CN (0,Gk) , k ∈ K (20a)
qi = qi +∆qi, ∆qi ∼ CN (0,Qi) i ∈ I (20b)
where gk and qi are the estimated CSI, which are known at the CBS; ∆gk and ∆qi denote the channel
error vectors, respectively; Gk and Qi are the covariance matrices of the corresponding channel error
vectors; ∆gk and ∆gj are independent for any k 6= j; ∆qi is independent of ∆qj for any i 6= j.
B. The Outage-Constrained Transmit Power Minimization Problem
In this subsection, based on the probabilistic CSI error model, the transmit power minimization problem
is considered under the probabilistic constraints. In this case, the transmit power minimization problem
is formulated as follows
P8 : min
W,Σ,ρ
Tr (W +Σ) (21a)
s.t. Pr {Cs − Ce,k ≥ Rmin} ≥ 1−̟r, k ∈ K (21b)
Pr
{
η
(
g
†
k (W +Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ ψe,k
}
≥ 1−̟e,k, k ∈ K (21c)
Pr
{
q
†
i (W +Σ)qi ≤ PIn,i
}
≥ 1−̟I,i, i ∈ I (21d)
C2, C5− C8 (21e)
where ̟r ∈ (0, 1], ̟e,k ∈ (0, 1] and ̟I,i ∈ (0, 1] denote the maximum outage probabilities associated
with the secrecy rate and the EH of kth EHR, and the maximum tolerable probability that the interference
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power caused to the ith PU is larger than PIn,i, respectively. The outage secrecy rate constraint presented
by (21b) guarantees that the probability of the secrecy rate being larger than Rmin is larger than 1−̟r.
The constraint given by (21c) is to guarantee that the outage probability of the minimum EH requirement
of the kth EHR is less than ̟e,k. The constraint presented by (21c) guarantees that the probability that
the interference power causing to the ith PU is larger than PIn,i is less than ̟I,i. It is difficult to solve
P8 since P8 is non-convex and the expressions given by (21b), (21c) and (21d) have no closed-form
expressions. In order to solve P8, a safe approximation to P8 is given based on Bernstein-type inequalities.
Here, “safe” means that the obtained solution based on such an approximation always satisfies the outage-
based constraints [31].
Lemma 2 The Bernstein-type Inequality I [28]: Let f (z) = z†Az+ 2Re{z†b}+ c, where A ∈ HN ,
b ∈ CN×1, c ∈ R and z ∼ CN (0, I). For any ̟ ∈ (0 1], an approximate and convex form for
Pr {f (z) ≥ 0} ≥ 1−̟ (22)
can be written as
Tr (A)−
√
−2 ln (̟)υ1 + ln (̟) υ2 + c ≥ 0 (23a)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec (A)√
2b
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ υ1 (23b)
υ2I+A  0, υ2 ≥ 0 (23c)
where υ1 and υ2 are slack variables.
Lemma 3 The Bernstein-type Inequality II [41]: Let f (z) = z†Az+2Re{z†b}+ c, where A ∈ HN ,
b ∈ CN×1, c ∈ R and z ∼ CN (0, I). For any ̟ ∈ (0 1], an approximate and convex form for the
constraint
Pr {f (z) ≤ 0} ≥ 1−̟ (24)
can be written as
Tr (A) +
√
−2 ln (̟)υ1 − ln (̟) υ2 + c ≤ 0 (25a)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec (A)√
2b
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ υ1 (25b)
υ2I−A  0, υ2 ≥ 0 (25c)
where υ1 and υ2 are slack variables.
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Let ∆gk = G
1/2
k ĝk, where ĝk ∼ CN (0, I) and k ∈ K. By applying Lemma 2, an approximation to
the outage secrecy rate constraint presented in (21b) can be given as
z =
ρ
(
h†Σh+ σ2s
)
+ σ2s,p
ρ (h† (Σ+W)h+ σ2s) + σ
2
s,p
(26a)
Tr
(
G
1/2
k MG
1/2
k
)
−
√
−2 ln̟rδr,k + ln̟rνr,k + cr,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K (26b)
cr,k = gk
†Mgk −
(
2Rminz − 1)σ2e , k ∈ K (26c)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec(G1/2k MG1/2k )√
2G
1/2
k Mgk
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ δr,k, k ∈ K (26d)
νr,kI+G
1/2
k MG
1/2
k  0, νr,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K (26e)
where M =
((
1− 2Rz)Σ− 2RzW); δr,k and νr,k are slack variables. Similar to the outage secrecy
rate constraint, using Lemma 2, the outage EH constraint given by (21c) can be approximated as
Tr
(
G
1/2
k (W +Σ)G
1/2
k
)
−
√
−2 ln (̟e,k)δe,k + ln (̟e,k) νe,k + ce,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K (27a)
ce,k = σ
2
e + gk
† (W+Σ)gk − ψe,k
η
, k ∈ K (27b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec(G1/2k (W+Σ)G1/2k )√
2G
1/2
k (W+Σ)gk
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ δe,k, k ∈ K (27c)
νe,kI+G
1/2
k (W +Σ)G
1/2
k  0, νe,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K (27d)
where δe,k and νe,k are slack variables. Let ∆qi = Q1/2i q̂i, where q̂i ∼ CN (0, I) and i ∈ I . Applying
Lemma 3 to the constraint presented in (21d), an approximation form for this constraint can be given
as
Tr
(
Q
1/2
i (W+Σ)Q
1/2
i
)
+
√−2 ln̟I,iδI,i − ln (̟I,i) νI,i + cq,i ≤ 0, i ∈ I (28a)
cq,i = qi
† (W+Σ)qi − PIn,i, i ∈ I (28b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec(Q1/2i (W +Σ)Q1/2i )√
2Q
1/2
i (W+Σ)qi
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ δI,i, i ∈ I (28c)
νI,iI−Q1/2i (W +Σ)Q1/2i  0, νI,i ≥ 0, i ∈ I (28d)
where δI,i and νI,i are slack variables. Although the safe approximations to the probabilistic constraints
have been applied, the approximation to P8 is still non-convex since there is a rank-one constraint, a
fractional constraint and coupling among different variables. By using SDR, the approximation problem
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for P8 can be relaxed as
P9 : min
W,Σ,ρ,z,{δr,k},{νr,k},{δe,k},{νe,k},{δI,i},{νI,i}
Tr (W +Σ) (29a)
s.t. (26) , (27) , (28) , C2, C5, C6 and C8. (29b)
Note that P9 is still non-convex due to the factional constraint and the coupling of z with the other
variables. It is seen from (26a) that 0 < z ≤ 1. Thus, the optimal z can be obtained by using a one-
dimensional line search method. Let t = 1/ρ. For a given z, an approximation to the relaxed P9 can be
given as
P10 : min
W,Σ,t,{δr,k},{νr,k},{δe,k},{νe,k},{δI,i},{νI,i}
Tr (W +Σ) (30a)
s.t. h† ((z − 1)Σ+ zW)h+ (z − 1) (tσ2s,p + σ2s) = 0 (30b)
t > 1 (30c)
(12b) , (26b)− (26e) , (27) , (28) , C5 and C8. (30d)
It is seen from (30) that for a given z P10 is convex and can be solved by the software CVX [40]. Based
on the above-mentioned analysis, P9 can be solved by applying the modified Algorithm 1. In this case,
̟r, ̟e,k and ̟I,i are required to be initialized. The uniform search variable is z instead of β and its
search interval is (0 1]. Problem P10 is required to be solved instead of P3.
Remark 4: Problem P9 cannot guarantee that its solution, W, is rank-one. If the solution W is rank-
one, the optimal robust secure beamforming for P9 can be obtained by the eigenvalue decomposition.
If the solution W is not rank-one, the well-known Gaussian randomization procedure can be applied to
obtain the suboptimal robust secure beamforming vector [42].
C. The Outage-Constrained Max-Min Fairness EH Problem
In this subsection, the outage max-min fairness EH problem is first formulated subject to the proba-
bilistic constraints, and this problem has not been studied before. The max-min fairness EH problem is
formulated under the probabilistic CSI error model as
P11 : max
W,Σ,ρ
ΓE (31a)
s.t. Pr
{
η
(
g
†
k (W +Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ ΓE
}
≥ 1−̟e,k, k ∈ K (31b)
(21b) , (21d) , C2, C5− C8 (31c)
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where ΓE is the outage energy harvested by the EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion. Note that P11
can guarantee that the probability of the outage max-min fairness energy harvested by the EHRs satisfies
the following inequality
Pr
{
min
k∈K
η
(
g
†
k (W +Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ ΓE
}
=
K∏
k=1
Pr
{
η
(
g
†
k (W +Σ)gk + σ
2
e
)
≥ ΓE
}
≥
K∏
k=1
(1−̟e,k). (32)
Problem P11 is also challenging due to the probabilistic constraints. In order to solve P11, using
the same techniques as those used for solving P8, a modified Algorithm 1 can be used to solve the
approximate problem for P11. For a given z, the approximate problem is given as
P12 : max
W,Σ,t,{δr,k},{νr,k},{δe,k},{νe,k},{δI,i},{νI,i}
ΓE (33a)
s.t. ce,k = σ2e + gk
† (W +Σ) gk − ΓE
η
, k ∈ K (33b)
(12b) , (26b)− (26e) , (27a) , (27c) , (27d) , (28) , (30b) , (30c) , C5 and C8 (33c)
where δr,k ≥ 0 and νr,k ≥ 0, δe,k ≥ 0 and νe,k ≥ 0, δI,i ≥ 0 and νI,i ≥ 0, are the slack variables
associated with the outage secrecy rate constraint in (21b), the constraint in (31b) and the constraint in
(21d), respectively. t is equal to 1/ρ. Problem P12 is convex and can be solved by the software CVX.
Note that the solution W for P12 may be not rank-one. Thus, the optimal beamforming vector wopt for
P12 is obtained when W is rank-one. Otherwise, the suboptimal beamforming vector w is attained by
using the well-known Gaussian randomization procedure.
Remark 5: The complexity of Algorithm 1 under the probabilistic CSI error model also comes from
three parts, namely, the uniform line search, iteration complexity and the per-iteration computation cost.
Since the numbers of the norm-constraints and the positive semidefinite matrix constraints for P10 are
the same as those of the relaxed approximation to P12, the only difference of their complexities lies in
the number of uniform searches. Assume that the accuracy of the iteration is ε and the number of the
uniform searches is T2, then the total complexity of the modified Algorithm 1 under the probabilistic
CSI error model is given by
T2 ln
(
ε−1
)O (KMN2t )√(2K +M + 2)Nt + 3M + 6K + 4
× {(2K +M + 2)N2t (Nt +O (KMN2t ))+ (2K +M + 4) (1 +O (KMN2t ))
+(2K +M) [Nt (Nt + 1) + 1]
2 +O2 (KMN2t )} . (34)
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TABLE II: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Values
Number of PU receivers M = 2
Number of EHRs N = 3
Energy conservation efficiency η = 1
Maximum tolerable interference power PIn,i = −10 dB, i ∈ I
Maximum transmit power Pth = 2 dB
Variances of noise σ2s = 0.1, σ2e = 0.1, σ2s,p = 0.01
Minimum EHs of the SU and the EHRs ψs = 22 dBm, ψe,k = 23 dBm
Channel power gains h ∼ CN (0, I), gk ∼ CN (0, I) , k ∈ K, qi ∼ CN (0, 0.1I) , i ∈ I
Maximum outage probabilities ̟r = ̟e,k = ̟I,i = 0.05, k ∈ K, 〉 ∈ I
It is seen from (19) and (34) that the effect of T1 on the complexity of Algorithm 1 and the effect of
T2 on the complexity of the modified Algorithm 1 are little. The complexities of Algorithm 1 and the
modified Algorithm 1 largely lie in the complexity of iteration and the per-iteration computation cost. It
is also observed that the complexity of Algorithm 1 under the bounded CSI error model is lower than
that of the modified Algorithm 1 under the probabilistic CSI error model.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed robust
secure beamforming schemes. Performance comparisons are made for robust secure beamforming schemes
under the bounded CSI error model and robust secure beamforming schemes under the probabilistic CSI
error model. The simulation results are based on the simulation settings given in Table II.
The covariance matrices of ∆gk, k ∈ K and ∆qi, i ∈ I under the probabilistic CSI error model are
ε2e,kI and ε2q,iI, where ε2e,k and ε2q,i are the variance of the corresponding CSI error, respectively. According
to [26]-[29], in order to provide a fair comparison between the performance under the bounded CSI model
with that under the probabilistic CSI error model, the radiuses of the uncertainty regions, Ψe,k and ΨP,i
are set based on
ξe,k =
√
ε2e,kF
−1
2Nt
(1−̟e,k)
2
(35a)
ξP,i =
√
ε2q,iF
−1
2Nt
(1−̟q,i)
2
(35b)
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where F−1
2Nt
(·) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the (central) Chi-square
distribution with 2Nt degrees of freedom.
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Fig. 2: (a) The empirical CDF of the minimum transmit power of the CBS under different CSI scenarios,
Rmin = 1.5 bits/s/Hz; (b) The empirical CDF of the max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs under
different CSI scenarios, Rmin = 1.5 bits/s/Hz.
Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF of the minimum transmit power of the CBS and the empirical CDF
of the max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs under different CSI error scenarios. The minimum
secrecy rate is set as Rmin = 1.5 bits/s/Hz. ε2e,k for all k and ε2q,i for all i are set as ε2e,k = 0.001 and
ε2q,i = 0.0001, respectively. The number of the transmit antennas of the CBS is Nt = 10. The empirical
CDFs shown in Fig. 2 are obtained by using 1,000 channel realizations. It is seen from Fig. 2(a) that the
required transmit power under the perfect CSI is the least among all CSI scenarios. The reason is that
the CBS under the perfect CSI scenario does not require additional transmit power to overcome channel
uncertainty. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the max-min fairness energy of EHRs obtained under the perfect CSI
is the largest compared with those attained under other scenarios. This is due to the fact that the CBS
requires more transmit power to guarantee that the SU receiver obtains the minimum secrecy rate when
the CSI is imperfect. It is interesting to observe from Fig. 2(a) that the transmit power required under the
probabilistic CSI error model is less than that under the bounded CSI error model, and from Fig. 2(b)
that the max-min fairness energy of EHRs attained under the probabilistic CSI error model is larger than
that obtained under the bounded CSI error model. This can be explained by the fact that the constraints
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Fig. 3: Average computation time of different optimization problems under different CSI error models,
Rmin = 1.5 bits/s/Hz, Nt = 10 or Nt = 15.
associated with the secrecy rate, the EH of EHRs and the interference power under the probabilistic CSI
error model is looser than those under the bounded CSI error model.
A comparison is presented in Fig. 3 for the average computation times of different optimization
problems (i.e., the transmit power minimization problem and the max-min EH fairness problem) under
the probabilistic CSI error model with those under the bounded CSI error model. The results are obtained
by using a computer with 32-bit Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M, 4 GB RAM. It is seen that the average
computation time of the transmit power minimization problem is almost the same as that of the max-min
EH fairness problem under the probabilistic CSI error model. This phenomenon can also be seen under
the bounded CSI error model. The reason is that the complexities of different optimization problems
presented in Section III and Section IV under the same CSI error model are almost the same. As shown
in Fig. 3, the average computation time of the optimization problem under the probabilistic CSI error
model is higher than that of the corresponding optimization problem under the bounded error model.
This indicates that the complexity of the optimization problem under the probabilistic CSI error model is
higher than that of the corresponding optimization problem under the bounded error model. Moreover, it
is observed that the average computation time greatly increases with the number of the transmit antennas
of the CBS irrespective of the optimization problems and the CSI error models. This is in complete
agreement with our analysis presented in Section IV.
Figure 4 shows the minimum transmit power of the CBS versus the secrecy rate of the SU receiver
under different CSI error models. Nt is set as Nt = 10 or Nt = 15. It is seen that the minimum transmit
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Fig. 4: The minimum transmit power of the CBS versus the secrecy rate of the SU receiver under different
CSI error models, Nt = 10 or Nt = 15.
power of the CBS increases with the minimum secrecy rate requirement, regardless of the CSI error
model. The reason is that a higher transmit power is required to guarantee the increasing secrecy rate
requirement. It is also observed that the transmit power of the CBS decreases with the increase of the
number of the transmit antennas of the CBS. It is explained by the fact that an increase of the number
of antennas increases degrees of freedom of the transmit power allocation. Finally, it is also seen that
the minimum transmit power of the CBS under the bounded CSI error model is larger than that under
the probabilistic CSI error model.
Figure 5 compares the max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs achieved under the probabilistic
CSI error model with that obtained under the bounded CSI error model. The number of the transmit
antennas of the CBS is set as Nt = 10 or Nt = 15. It is seen that the max-min fairness energy of EHRs
decreases with the increase of the minimum secrecy rate requirement of the SU receiver irrespective
of the CSI error models. This indicates that there is a tradeoff between the max-min fairness energy
harvested by EHRs and the secrecy rate of the SU receiver. It is interesting to observe that the gap
between the max-min fairness energy of EHRs achieved under the probabilistic CSI error model and
that obtained under the bounded CSI model decreases with the increase of the minimum secrecy rate
requirement of the SU receiver. This phenomenon is due to the transmit power constraint, which limits
the maximum transmit power of the CBS. As shown in Fig. 5, the max-min fairness energy harvested
by EHRs increases with the number of the transmit antennas of the CBS. This can be explained by the
fact that the diversity gain increases when the number of the transmit antennas of the CBS is increased.
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Fig. 5: The max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs versus the secrecy rate of the SU receiver under
different CSI error models, Nt = 10 or Nt = 15.
Finally, it is also observed that the max-min fairness energy of EHRs achieved under the probabilistic
CSI error model is larger than that achieved under the bounded CSI error model.
Figure 6 presents the minimum transmit power of the CBS and the max-min fairness energy harvested
by EHRs versus the number of EHRs under different CSI error models. The minimum secrecy rate of the
SU receiver is set as Rmin = 2 bits/s/Hz. The number of the transmit antennas of the CBS is Nt = 10 or
Nt = 15, respectively. It is seen from Fig. 6(a) that the minimum transmit power of the CBS increases
with the number of EHRs irrespective of the CSI error models. The reason is that the transmit power of
the CBS with respect to the transmit power minimization problem is required to be increased in order to
satisfy the minimum secrecy rate requirement of the SU receiver when the number of the EHRs increases.
It is observed from Fig. 6(b) that the max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs decreases with the
increase of the number of EHRs. This can be explained by the fact that the robust secure beamforming
is required to be designed to guarantee the secrecy rate of the SU receiver, which is susceptible to the
number of the EHRs. As shown in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), when the number of the transmit antennas of
the CBS is Nt = 10, the transmit power minimization problem and the max-min fairness EH problem
under the bounded CSI error model are infeasible when the number of EHRs is larger than 6. The reason
is that the minimum secrecy rate of the SU receiver cannot be satisfied due to the maximum transmit
power constraint. This is consistent with our analysis presented in Section III. It is also seen from Fig. 6
that a performance gain can be obtained under the probabilistic error model compared with that attained
under the bounded error model irrespective of the number of EHRs. Specifically, the minimum transmit
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Fig. 6: (a) The minimum transmit power of the CBS versus the number of EHRs under different CSI
error scenarios, Rmin = 2 bits/s/Hz, Nt = 10 or Nt = 15; (b) The max-min fairness energy harvested by
EHRs versus the number of EHRs under different CSI error scenarios, Rmin = 2 bits/s/Hz, Nt = 10 or
Nt = 15.
power of the CBS required under the probabilistic error model is smaller than that required under the
bounded model, and the max-min energy harvested by EHRs under the probabilistic error model is larger
than that obtained under the bounded model irrespective of the number of EHRs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Secure communication was studied for a MISO CR downlink network with SWIPT. Robust secure
beamforming and power splitting ratio were jointly designed under the imperfect CSI in order to guar-
antee secure communication and energy harvested by EHRs. The transmit power of the CBS and the
max-min fairness energy harvested by EHRs were optimized under the bounded CSI error model and
the probabilistic CSI error model. A one-dimensional search algorithm was proposed to solve these
challenging non-convex problems. The inner component of the proposed algorithm is only required to
solve the convex problems. It was proved that the optimal robust secure beamforming vector and the
optimal AN covariance matrix can always be found under the bounded CSI error model. The optimal
robust secure beamforming vector under the probabilistic CSI error model cannot be guaranteed and a
suboptimal beamforming scheme was found. It was shown that a performance gain can be achieved under
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the probabilistic CSI error model compared with that under the bounded CSI error model at the cost of
the implementation complexity. A tradeoff was found between the secure rate of the SU receiver and the
energy harvested by EHRs under a max-min fairness criterion.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CONSTRAINT C1
By introducing a slack variable β, one can rewrite C1 as
log2
(
1 +
ρh†Wh
ρ (h†Σh+ σ2s) + σ
2
s,p
)
− log2β ≥ Rmin (36a)
1 +
g
†
kWgk
g
†
kΣgk + σ
2
e
≤ β, ∀∆gk ∈ Ψe,k, k ∈ K. (36b)
Let t = 1/ρ, where t > 1. Eq. (10a) is obtained by performing some algebraic manipulations on (36a).
Applying Lemma 1, using the fact that ∆g†k∆gk ≤ ξ2e,k, k ∈ K, and substituting gk = gk + ∆gk into
(36b), one has
∆g†k (W − (β − 1)Σ)∆gk + 2Re
(
gk
† (W− (β − 1)Σ)∆gk
)
+ gk
† (W − (β − 1)Σ)gk − (β − 1) σ2e ≤ 0 (37)
and (10b) holds when ωk ≥ 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof for Theorem 1 is based on the KKT optimality conditions of P2. Let Ξ denote a collection
of all the dual and primal variables related to P2. Then, the Lagrangian of P2 is given by
L (Ξ) =Tr (W+Σ)− α{Tr{(W + (1− 2Rminβ)Σ)H}+ (1− 2Rminβ) (σ2s + tσ2s,p)}
−
K∑
k=1
Tr {AkΓk (ωk,W,Σ, β)} −
K∑
k=1
Tr {BkΓk (µk,W,Σ)} −
M∑
i=1
Tr {DiΓi (δi,W,Σ)}
− ν1
{(
Tr (WH+ΣH) + σ2s
)− (1 + 1
t− 1
)
1
η
ψs
}
+ ν2 (Tr (W+Σ)− Pth)
− Tr (WY)− Tr (ΣZ) + Λ (38)
where α ∈ R+, ν1 ∈ R+ and ν2 ∈ R+, are the dual variables with respect to (10a), (12b) and C5,
respectively. Λ denotes the collection of terms involving the variables, which are not related to the proof.
Ak ∈ HN+ , Bk ∈ HN+ , Di ∈ HN+ , Y ∈ HN+ and Z ∈ HN+ are the dual variables with respect to (10b),
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(11a), (11b) and (8i), respectively. Let Λk = [ I gk ] and Υi = [ I qi ]. Then, Γk (ωk,W,Σ, β),
Γk (µk,W,Σ) and Γi (δi,W,Σ) can be rewritten as
Γk (ωk,W,Σ, β) =
 ωkI 0
0 (β − 1) σ2e − ωkξ2e,k
−ΛHk (W − (β − 1)Σ)Λk (39a)
Γk (µk,W,Σ) =
 µkI 0
0 σ2e − ψe,kη−1 − µkξ2e,k
+ΛHk (W+Σ)Λk, k ∈ K (39b)
Γi (δi,W,Σ) =
 δiI 0
0 PIn,i − δiξ2P,i
−ΥHi (W +Σ)Υi, i ∈ I. (39c)
The partial KKT conditions related to the proof can be given as
I− αH+
K∑
k=1
Λk (Ak −Bk)ΛHk +
M∑
i=1
ΥiDiΥ
H
i − ν1H+ ν2I−Y = 0 (40a)
YW = 0 (40b)
t =
√
ηα (2Rminβ − 1)σs,p +
√
ν1ψs√
ηα (2Rminβ − 1)σs,p
(40c)
Ak,Bk,Di  0, α, ν1, ν2 ≥ 0. (40d)
Since t > 1, it can be obtained from (40c) that α > 0 and ν1 > 0. Right-multiplying (40a) by W and
combining (40b), one has(
(1 + ν2) I+
M∑
i=1
ΥiDiΥ
H
i +
K∑
k=1
Λk (Ak −Bk)ΛHk
)
W = (α+ ν1)HW. (41)
According to (41), one has
Rank
{(
(1 + ν2) I+
M∑
i=1
ΥiDiΥ
H
i +
K∑
k=1
Λk (Ak −Bk)ΛHk
)
W
}
= Rank {(α+ ν1)HW} (42a)
Rank {(α+ ν1)HW} ≤ 1. (42b)
According to (40a), one has(
(1 + ν2) I+
M∑
i=1
ΥiDiΥ
H
i +
K∑
k=1
Λk (Ak −Bk)ΛHk
)
= Y + (α+ ν1)H. (43)
Since Y + (α+ ν1)H ≻ 0, one obtains the following relationship
Rank (W) = Rank
{(
(1 + ν2) I+
M∑
i=1
ΥiDiΥ
H
i +
K∑
k=1
Λk (Ak −Bk)ΛHk
)
W
}
= Rank {(α+ ν1)HW} ≤ 1. (44)
Thus, if P2 is feasible and Rmin > 0, the rank of W is one. The proof is completed.
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